



Department of State
10143-2355

EXCISE
TELEGRAM

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[Handwritten notes and signatures in a box]

ROUTINE

ALBAC.

CFR REPORT, INFORM CONSULS, CINC/SHAPE FOR POLADS ONLY

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/25/85 {TARNOFF, PETER}

TAGS: XX, US

SUBJECT: {U} CURRENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, ISSUE NO. 29,
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2. (U) NEA - U.S. ORDERS PRECAUTIONARY EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS AND NON-ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEES FROM KABUL (GDS 7/25/85)

(LOU) IN THE FACE OF A DETERIORATING INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION AND A RISING LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN KABUL AND ALONG THE MAJOR OVERLAND ROUTE TO PAKISTAN, WE ORDERED THE EVACUATION OF ALL USG DEPENDENTS AND NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FROM AFGHANISTAN. THEY WILL BE COMING OUT OVER A TWO WEEK PERIOD ON REGULARLY SCHEDULED FLIGHTS. WE HAVE ADVISED THE PRIVATE AMERICAN COMMUNITY TO DO LIKEWISE AND ARE URGING THAT NON-ESSENTIAL TRAVEL TO AFGHANISTAN NOT BE UNDERTAKEN AT THIS TIME. OUR DRAWDOWN WILL INVOLVE ABOUT 100 PEOPLE. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE DRA THAT OUR DECISION DOES NOT REPRESENT A POLITICAL JUDGMENT BUT RATHER A PRUDENT STEP IN LIGHT OF OUR SECURITY CONCERNS.

(LOU) IN APPARENT RESPONSE TO OUR DECISION, THE DRA SUBSEQUENTLY NOTIFIED US THAT WE SHOULD REDUCE OUR STAFF IN KABUL IN LIGHT OF OUR REDUCED LEVEL OF AID. THE DRA HAS ASKED THE STAFF ASSIGNED AFTER THE APRIL 1978 REVOLUTION BE WITHDRAWN, BUT WE STILL ARE NOT CERTAIN WHAT THE FINAL LEVEL WILL BE.

(C) THE TREND OF THE INSURGENCY CONTINUES TO RUN AGAINST THE KHALQI REGIME OF MOOR MOHAMMED TARAKI AS REPORTS OF FIGHTING AND SERIOUS MILITARY MORALE AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS MULTIPLY. HOWEVER, THE REBELS HAVE STILL NOT DEMONSTRATED A CAPABILITY TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIVITIES OR TO STRIKE EFFECTIVELY AT THE SEAT OF KHALQI POWER IN KABUL. THE SOVIETS ARE PROBABLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE STAYING POWER OF THE REGIME AND MAY HOPE FOR SOME KIND OF POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN SITUATION. WHILE THE PRESENT REGIME IS CLEARLY IN TROUBLE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT HOW OR WHEN LEADERSHIP CHANGES MIGHT OCCUR.

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